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I. Introduction
Historically, the courts have played a modest if essential role in our society. 
Their function has been to resolve disputes. The nature of those disputes was in 
part private - quarrels between individuals which the courts were called upon to 
settle. Such of it as was public was largely limited to criminal law and certain fun­
damental constitutional questions. Most people passed their lives untouched by 
the law.
All that is hanging of late. More and more, the headlines of our newspapers 
are concerned with judicial decisions. More and more, courts are being called 
upon to decide questions of central importance to great numbers of individuals in 
our society; questions which go far beyond the traditional areas of legal scrutiny 
into the uncharted waters of central social issues.
I propose to examine this changer its dimensions; its causes; most important­
ly, its impact, not only on the judiciary but on relationships between the judiciary 
and other branches of government. It will be my thesis that the developments of 
the past decade presage a new era when the traditional allocation of powers be­
tween the judiciary and other branches of government will be fundamentally 
altered. Only if we work cooperatively and responsibly toward developing new 
relationships between the different branches of our government will our govern­
mental institutions be able to meet the complex challenges which lie ahead.
II. The Traditional Relationship
As any first year political science student will tell you, Canadian government, like 
most other governments in the western world, possesses three branches. The first 
is the legislative branch. It consists of Parliament and the ten provincial legisla­
tures. These branches, at least in theory, make our laws. The second is the execu­
tive branch, which functions to implement and enforce the laws adopted by the 
legislative branches. The third branch of government, the judiciary, until recently 
lagged far behind the legislative and executive branches in importance.
For centuries, the courts could scarcely lay honest claim to constituting a dis­
tinct branch of government. One need only recall the methods of the Star Cham­
* Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. Text of the Viscount Bennett Memorial Lecture, 
delivered at the Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick, 26 October 1989.
ber of Elizabethan times to be reminded of the servile connection between the 
courts and the executive-legislative function that reposed in the King. Gradually, 
over the centuries, the idea of the courts as independent adjudicators, beholden 
to no power, whether executive or legislative, gained credence.
The battle for judicial independence was not easily won. In the days of James 
I that great judge, Sir Edward Coke, asserted the independence of judges. The 
King summoned all the Judges before him and told them that he proposed to 
take such cases as he pleased away from the judges and try them himself. He was 
supported by Archbishop Bancroft, who asserted that according to the scriptures, 
the ultimate power to try cases rested with the Sovereign. But the Chief Justice 
took issue. The King had no such power, he affirmed; all cases must be tried in a 
Court of Justice. The exchange between the King and Chief Justice is recorded:
King James (Whom, you will obseve, was no mean cross-examiner) demanded: I 
always thought and I have often heard the boast that your F.ngiish iaw is founded 
upon reason. If that be so, why have not I and others reason as well as you the 
Judges?
The Chief Justice (who was, it seems, a rather adept chap himself) responded 
smoothly, but firmly): True it is, please your Majesty, that God has endowed your 
Majesty with excellent science as well as great gifts of nature; but your Majesty 
will allow me to say so, with all reverence, that you are not learned in the laws of 
this your realm of England... which is an art which requires long study and expe­
rience before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it. The law is the golden 
me-wand and measure to tiy the cases of your Majesty’s subjects, and it is by that 
law that your Majesty is protected in safety and peace.
King James replied, reportedly in anger: Then I am to be under the law - 
which it is treason to affirm.
The Chief Justice did not hesitate in his response: Thus wrote Bracton, “The 
King is under no man, but under God and the law.”
Here we have the issue revealed in its true dimensions. It was not at base a dis­
pute about which individuals were fit to sit as judges; it concerned rather the fun­
damental proposition that all state institutions - even the King - are subject to the 
rule of law.
An interesting sidelight is that in typical English fashion, the dispute was not 
resolved by high statements of principle, but practical realities. James is said, 
notwithstanding the enjoinder of his Chief Justice, to have tried his hand at judg­
ing. He became so perplexed after hearing both sides, that he abandoned the at­
tempt. “I could get on very well hearing one side only, but when both sides have 
been heard upon my word I know not which is right,” the Sovereign is said to 
have observed in despair.
Thereafter, the business of judging was confined exclusively to the Courts. 
But further battle ensued over whether judges could be called upon by other
branches of government to answer for their decisions. Thus in Knowles' Trial, 
when Holt, the Lord Chief Justice, was called before a committee of the House of 
Lords to explain why he had quashed an indictment for murder he stated:
The judgment is questionable in a proper method, but I am not to be questioned 
for my judgement.1
In the same spirit his fellow judge, Justice Eyres, affirmed that his judgment 
spoke for itself and could not be questioned:
I humbly beg pardon if I say I ought not by the law to be called to account for 
the reasons of my opinion. If we err, the judgment may be rectified by writ of er­
ror, but the law acquits us.2
Before the full House of Lords, Holt and Eyres remained steadfast in their 
refusal to give reasons for their judgment, and at the end of the day their view of 
judicial independence prevailed.
Such issues still rear their heads from time to time; witness the recent deci­
sion of the Supreme Court of Canada that a royal commission, an emanation of 
the executive branch of government, could not compel judges of the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal to answer for their decision in the Marshall case.3
Nevertheless, by the mid-Nineteenth Century, when the governmental ar­
chitecture of Canada was conceived, the principle of an independent judiciary, 
answerable to neither the legislative nor the executive branches of government, 
was well-established. The British North America Act, 1867, building on these tra­
ditions, made provision for the establishment of a federally-appointed judiciary 
charged with not only the traditional judicial tasks of presiding over criminal 
cases and disputes between citizens, but with a third task arising out of the new 
country’s federal nature - adjudication on the constitutional division of powers be­
tween the federal and provincial legislatures. That the execution of these func­
tions was until 1949 subject to final appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Pnvy 
Council in London, did not detract from the independent role accorded the judi­
ciary under the B.NA. Act.
For almost a century and a quarter, the relationship between the courts and 
the other branches of government remained essentially static, fixed by the frame­
work of the B.NA. Act. The respective roles of the legislative, executive and judi­
cial branches of government were well-defined and unquestioned. The legisla­
tures, federal and provincial, made the law. The executive implemented and en­
forced the law. To the courts fell the task of interpreting the law which others 
made and enforced.
'Knowles Trial (1692), 12 How. St. Tr. 1167 at 1181.
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This interpretation of the law possessed three main facets. The first was the 
interpretation and application of the common law inherited from England and 
the Quebec Civil Code. The courts’ function as interpreters of the common law 
was not without its creative aspect. By the application of the doctrine of prece­
dent - the application of established common law principles to new situations - 
the courts played a modest role in the making of the law that belied the theoreti­
cal division of powers between the legislature and the judiciary. From time to 
time, under the guise of extending existing rules, the courts created new systems 
of rights and obligations. One such creative leap occurred with Donoghue v. 
Stevenson4, whidi introduced the revolutionary idea that each person owed a duty 
of care not to injure his neighbour with the foreseeable consequences of his or 
her negligent acts. Another such leap occurred in 1967 with the case of Hedley 
Byrne v. Heller5 which extended the duty of care to negligent statements. The most 
recent extension of the concept of negligence came with the case of Anns v. 
Merton London Borough Council in which the courts ventured to call to account 
the legislative and executive branches of government for failure to properly carry 
out tasks which they had undertaken in the exercise of their law-making and law- 
implementing role.
While these landmark cases originated in England, each of them was swiftly 
adopted by Canadian courts and applied in the Canadian context. In recent years, 
Canadian courts have been notably active in developing the law through existing 
common law and equitable principles. Canadian courts have shown themselves 
particularly sensitive to the plight of the little person, in face of the greater power 
of the large corporation or the uncaring entrepreneur. The doctrine of construc­
tive trust was developed to confer property interests on persons who had earned 
them. Unconscionable contracts were set aside, notwithstanding the absence of 
fraud.8 Fiduciary obligations were found and enforced, even in situations of com­
mercial contract.9 In short, Canadian courts in recent decades have assumed a 
relatively activist approach to the common law, not only applying established
4[1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.).
S[1964] A.C. 465, [1963] 2 All E.R. 575 (H.L.).
*[1978] A.C. 728, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 1024, [1977] 2 All E.R. 492 (H.L.).
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duty being owed by the Bank. The cases Bedard v. James (1986), 32 B.L.R. 188 (Ontario District 
Court) and Canadian Aero Services Ltd. v. O'Malley (1974), [1974] S.C.R. 592 demonstrate the 
court’s imposition of a fiduciary duty on the senior corporate personnel.
principles, but extending them where justice and fairness seemed to so require. 
Nevertheless, prior to the advent of the Charter, few would have suggested that 
the courts were significantly impinging on the legislative function reserved by the 
constitution for Parliament and the provincial legislatures. While the courts 
might from time to time extend the law, it was always open to the legislators to 
override or alter judicial advances. Ultimate legislative power rested with the 
legislative branch.
The second function which Canadian courts assumed under the B.NA. Act, 
1867 was the interpretation of statutes. Parliament and the legislatures passed 
the laws; and the courts interpreted them. The cardinal rule in this domain was 
deference to the legislature; the guiding principle the intent of the legislators, ac­
tual or presumed.
The third function which the courts assumed under the B.NA. Act was con­
struction of the constitution - for the most part a special and exalted form of 
statutory interpretation. The issue here was the division of powers, the task the 
scrutiny of legislative provisions to determine whether they were within the power 
of Parliament or the legislature which had passed them. Until 1949, it was the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council rather than Canadian courts which had 
the final say on these vital questions.
In addition to pronouncing on the division of powers, there were certain un­
written constitutional conventions which could be ruled upon by the courts. In a 
particularly significant decision of this type, The Patriation Reference, the Court 
ruled on the “conventional” requirements for constitutional amendment, thus 
helping to set the stage for the repatriation of the Canadian Constitution the fol­
lowing year. Another example of an unwritten constitutional convention of quite 
a different sort is the independence of the judiciary.11
The role of Canadian courts in our country’s first century may be sum­
marized as follows: our courts, like their predecessors in England, were essential­
ly independent - a third and autonomous branch of government. This indepen­
dence ensured that Canada was a country governed by the rule of law. By that I 
mean that all governmental institutions, whether legislative, executive or the judi­
ciary itself, were required to act in conformity with the law.
Having said that, the limited power of our courts prior to enactment of the 
Charter must be acknowledged. They could introduce changes in the common 
law but only at the pleasure of the legislatures, which retained the right to annul 
judicial doctrine. They could interpret statutes, but only with a view to extending 
the intention of the legislators. And they could rule on the respective legislative 
spheres of the federal or the provincial power, a procedural function only in­
directly related to the content of the law. Subject to constitutional convention and
l0Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution (1981), [1981] 1 S.GR. 735.
nSupra, note 3.
constraints imposed by the division of powers, Parliament and the legislatures 
remained dominant, the courts functioning as independent but essentially com­
plementary bodies.
III. Factors Changing The Role of The Courts
In recent times, a number of developments have occurred which threaten to alter 
the time-honoured relationship between the courts and other governmental in­
stitutions. The most significant is the Charter o f Rights and Freedoms, which we 
adopted in 1982. Prior to the Charter, Parliament and the Legislatures were sub­
ject to constraint in that they could exercise their powers only within the sphere of 
activity allotted to them respectively by the British North American Act, 1867. The 
Charter, however, added a new, overriding limit on the power of the legislatures. 
Henceforward, not only must laws be within the subject matter allotted to the 
legislature in question; they would be required to conform with the fundamental 
precepts established by the Charter. To the courts’ role as arbiters of the division 
of powers between the federal and provincial governments would be added the 
new task of determining whether the laws passed by these bodies violated the 
rights and freedoms granted by the Charter.
Nor was this expanded role of the courts confined to passing on the validity 
of laws. The Charter extends to all government action. Thus the mandate of the 
courts was expanded beyond passing on laws to determining the validity of 
government acts. ^Police conduct, for example, is now subject to Charter con­
straints. Even decisions of cabinet are not immune from judicial scrutiny, as the 
Operation Dismantle12 case illustrates. While the precise definition of “govern­
ment action” remains to be worked out,13 there can be no doubt even at this early 
stage of Charter interpretation that not only the governments but many of the 
agencies to which they delegate the handling of public business now find their 
conduct subject to Charter scrutiny.14
If government had always been subject to the rule of law, it was rendered, 
wth the passage of the Charter o f Rigfxts and Freedoms, subject to an express law 
of greatly expanded magnitude. Adoption of the Charter moved Canada away 
from the British model of unwritten constitutional conventions, toward the Amer­
ican model of a written declaration of rights and freedoms to which all branches 
of government were subject. I use the word “toward” advisedly. The Charter 
contains certain concessions to parliamentary sovereignty not found in the Amer­
ican constitution. The first is the override provision of s. 33 of the Charter, which
12[1985] 1 S.GR. 441.
13See Re Blainey v. Ontario Hockey Association (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 513 (CA.), leave to appeal to 
« T I T  ^  °* Canada dismisscd- «ported at (1986), 58 O.R. (2d) 274 and RW.D.S.U. v. 
Dotphm Delivery Ltd. (1986), [1986] 2 S.C.R 573, [1986] S.CJ. No. 75, 33 D.LR. (4th) 174 for an 
analysis of the scope of the Charter.
14Forexample in Connell v. University o f British Columbia (1988), [1988] B.CJ. No. 13 (CA.) al­
though there was insufficient government control of hiring to make this aspect of university adminis­
tration subject to Charter scrutiny, the provincial human rights code gave rise to the same result.
permits Parliament or the legislatures to maintain laws which violate many (but 
not all) of the rights and freedoms enumerated by the Charter for a period of five 
years. It is by virtue of s. 33 that the Quebec legislature has passed a sign law 
which violates the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Charter. In its only 
use by another province, Saskatchewan has employed s. 33 to override the pos­
sibility that the Charter gave employees a protected right to strike.16 The second 
concession to parliamentary sovereignty is found in s. 1 of the Charter, which pro­
vides that a law or government act which violates the guarantees of the Charter 
may nevertheless be valid if it is “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.” Thus the Charter recognizes that situations may arise where government 
action which violates some right or freedom may be justified.
While the Charter o f Rights and Freedoms is undoubtedly the single most im­
portant factor in the changing relationship of the courts to other branches of Ca­
nadian government, there is another, less obvious development which merits 
mention in that context. That is what I perceive to be the increasing tendency to 
transmute political and social questions to legal questions, thus placing the task of 
their resolution on the shoulders of the courts. This tendency is doubtless related 
in part to adoption of the Charter, for the Charter brings entire areas which were 
previously immune from legal scrutiny or subject only to limited legal scrutiny, 
into the legal arena - democratic rights, civil liberties and equality rights, to men­
tion only a few. But quite apart from the Charter, one detects an increasing 
tendency to look to the courts for answers to the difficult questions of our day. 
Bio-medical issues like sterilization17 and abortion;1S environmental issues like 
the recent Baie Comeau P.C.B. dispute; 19 native rights problems20 - on these is­
sues and others like them, people are increasingly turning to the courts for ans­
wers.
These developments prove that De Tocqueville’s observation with respect to 
our neighbours to the south is becoming increasingly applicable to Canada. The 
French nobleman wrote two centuries ago:
^Section 33 of the Charter provides that: (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may express­
ly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provi­
sion thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this 
Charter. Thus sections 3-5 (democratic rights), section 6 (mobility rights), sections 16 to 23 (lan­
guage rights) and section 28 (sexual equality rights) may not be overridden.
16Saskatchewan Government Employees’ Union Dispute Settlement Act 1984-85-86 S.S. c.111, s.9(l).
17See E. (Mrs.) v. Eve (1986), [1986] 2 S.GR. 388, [1986] S.GJ. No. 60 and Re K; K. v. Public Trustee 
(1985), [1985] 3 W.W.R. 204 (B.S.S.G).
18 Morgentaler v. R. (1988), [1988] 1 S.GR. 30 and the Daigle v. Tremblay (1989) (reasons pending 
S.GG).
19 On this same subject see also Re Attorney-General for Ontario and City o f Mississauga (1980), 33 
O.R. (2d) 395.
20 Such as the scope of aboriginal fishing rights as are presently before the Court in Sparrow v j t  
See also Hamlet o f Baker Lake v. Minister o f Indian Affairs and Northern Development (1980), [1980] 
F.G 518.
Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved,
sooner or later, into a juridical question.
The same, one ventures, may soon be said of this country.
What we have then, as a result of the Charter and the increasing tendency to 
refer difficult social and political questions to the court, is an enlarged role for the 
judicial arm of government. The pre-Charter view of our courts as independent 
but inherently limited in scope and function, must give way to a new view of the 
courts as the ultimate arbiters of our society, in the sense that whatever the legis­
lative and executive branches of government propose may ultimately be required 
to pass judicial scrutiny, subject to the right to override the courts granted by s 33 
of the Charter.
IV. The New Functions of the Court
I have suggested, in my comments thus far, that the traditional relationship be­
tween the judiciary and other branches of government has shifted as a con­
sequence of the Charter and the increasing tendency to refer difficult issues to the 
courts. Against this background, it is not amiss to examine the areas in which in­
creased reliance on the judiciary may have its greatest impact.
Three come to mind. The first is the responsibility of the court with respect 
to the framework of our government. The second relates to the responsibility of 
the Court for the relationship between individuals and the state - the question of 
civil liberties. The third concerns a different aspect of the relationship between 
the citizen and the state - the affirmative obligations of government toward the in­
dividuals who people the state. I turn first to the court’s role in monitoring the 
framework of government.
I have already alluded to the judiciary’s historic role in monitoring the divi­
sion of powers between the federal and provincial governments. That task con­
tinues; while division of powers cases are not the steady diet of Supreme Court 
Justices, each year gives rise to important questions as to where the boundary 
should be drawn between provincial and federal powers.
But the Charter has placed on courts an additional new responsibility with 
respect to the framework of our government. The Charter guarantees to each 
citizen certain democratic rights, including the right to vote. The right to vote has 
been interpreted by the courts as comprising the right to reasonable equality of 
voting power, with the result that electoral ridings which grossly violate this ideal, 
it being conceded that perfect equality cannot be realistically attained in the Ca­
nadian geographical context, have been struck down.21
Never have the courts been forced so dose to the essential core of the politi­
cal institutions of this country as they have been by the voting guarantees of the
Charter. Here is a function which the courts are compelled to assume, but which 
strikes at the core of the electoral process. The dilemma of the courts is dear. 
On the one hand, they must pronounce on the particular statute in question: does 
it or does it not violate the guarantees of the Charter1! On the other, there can be 
no doubt that within the proper constitutional limits, it is for the legislature or 
Parliament, as the case may be, to draw specific electoral boundaries. To compli­
cate matters, striking down the existing law may leave no electoral boundaries m 
place, giving rise to a constitutional dilemma of crisis proportions should the cur­
rent government fall. The duty of the courts with respect to voting rights raises m 
stark relief the conflict between the legislative function, which the courts must not 
usurp, and their obligation under the Charter to adjudicate on guaranteed rights.
The same conflict occurs with respect to the courts’ second main responsibili­
ty under our revised constitution - the responsibility to adjudicate on the rela­
tionship between the individual and the state. The Charter guarantees to each 
resident of Canada certain fundamental rights which the state must not infringe - 
for example, the right to liberty, the right to freedom of expression, the right to a 
fair trial, the right against self-incrimination, the right against unreasonable 
search and seizure. These are the “must-nots” of the Charter. Essentially, they 
guarantee a core of civil liberties into which the state must not venture, or may 
venture only on special conditions. They are the bulwark of the individual against 
abuse of state power and they make the courts the guardians of individual 
liberties. As the American founding father, Madison, explained in the debate on 
the first of the ten amendments:
If they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice 
will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardian of these rights; they 
will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legis­
lative or the Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment 
upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of 
rights.
Yet the courts’ duty to uphold individual rights and liberties may conflict with 
their duty to uphold the proper framework of government - a framework where 
courts decide legal questions and legislatures legislate. As Archibald Cox points 
out, judicial review of statutes and conduct affecting individual liberty “calls upon 
the Court to go over the very social, political and economic questions committed 
to the. . .  legislatures, yet it can scarcely do so without usurping in some degree 
the legislative function of weighing and balancing competing interests.”
Section 1 of the Canadian Charter expressly requires the Court to weigh and 
balance the policy interests for and against a government action or law, once an 
infringement has been found. Thus in Canada, there is no avoiding the dilemma 
of judicial policy-making. At the same time, it appears dear that the Supreme 
Court is determined not to venture too far into the uncharted waters of judicial
22A. Cox, “The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society” (1967) 50 Marquette Law Review 
575 at 582.
legislation or to pronounce more broadly than necessary on social and economic 
issues. This is apparent in R. v. Edwards Books Ltd.23 where the Court empha­
sized the need for deference to the legislating body in applying section 1 of the 
Charter. The courts should not set aside a legislative scheme which infringe indi_ 
vidual rights merely because they can think of a better solution less calculated to 
infringe rights. Rather, so long as the legislative scheme pursues a pressing and 
substantial objective and the means employed are proportional to the objective, it 
should be allowed to stand even though it may infringe individual liberties by 
more than a minimal amount.24
The third area in which the courts are increasingly being asked to adjudicate 
concerns, not protection of the individual against a potentially hostile govern­
ment, but the affirmative actions of the government toward its citizens. The dif­
ference, as Arclubald Cox has noted, is between warding off legislative attacks 
upon civil liberties and securing civil rights.25
Some provisions of the Charter, are worded in terms of protection from the 
invasive powers of the state. The right to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizure, self-incrimination and being tried twice for the same offence are such 
rights. But other rights are framed more in terms of what the state is obliged to 
provide than what it is forbidden to take away. The democratic right to vote is 
such a right, as are the guarantees of minority language education found in s. 23 
of the Charter. Similarly, the equality provisions of s. 15 of the Charter can be 
read as conferring not only a right not to be discriminated against by the state, 
but to be given equal rights and privileges. Note the affirmative language 
employed in Section 15(1):
15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability, (emphasis added)
Section 15(2) expressly endorses affirmative action programs by the state.
15(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its 
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups in- 
duding those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
It is too early to predict how the courts will interpret the equality provisions of the 
Charter. But legal scholars have outlined the possibilities - possibilities which in­
clude a much expanded view of the state’s obligation to citizens. In this regard it
°[1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
See A.G. Quebec v. Irwin Toy Limited [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, Slaight Communications Incorporated v. 
Davidson [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, and United States v. Cotroni [1989] SJ. No. 56.
“ Cox, supra, note 18 at 584.
has been suggested that while s. 15 will not be interpreted as requiring a general 
redistribution of wealth, it may require that resources of society be re-directed in 
ways which will bring about greater equality of opportunity by minimizing the dis­
parity in the skills and earning potential of people. De-institutionalization of the 
disabled, desegregation of educational facilities, attacks on exclusionary zoning 
and increasingly stringent accessibility requirements for all public and private 
buildings rank among the changes that could find support in the Charter's equality 
rights provisions.26
It remains to be seen how far Canadian courts will proceed down the path of 
enforcing affirmative rights. But if the United States affords an example, the 
trend will be difficult to resist. An example may be found in the equality provi­
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to provision of school facilities. 
Abstractly, a state could avoid discrimination on grounds of race by granting no 
one the protection of its laws. But in practice, this proved impossible. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the granting of certain privileges to one class of citizens 
imported an obligation to confer them on all citizens. Thus in the United States, 
following the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education” the courts adopted 
the approach of extending public school privileges to all students, rather than 
restricting the privileges white students enjoyed, which might, in its ultimate ex­
treme, have led to the closure of all public schools.
In essence, when a court is confronted with a discriminatory law, it has two 
options. It can strike the law out entirely, thereby negating the positive benefits it 
confers on many members of society. Or it can hold that the benefits conferred 
on some by the law should be extended to others. In either case, it can be argued 
that the intent of the legislator is violated. Where the law is struck out altogether, 
the intention to benefit some citizens is frustrated. Where the law is extended, the 
scope of the legislation is extended beyond what the legislators may have in­
tended. The choice is difficult. I f  a  l a w  is discriminatory or fails to assure guar­
anteed rights, should the entire law be struck out, leaving it to the legislature to 
replace it as it sees fit? Or should the court substitute its own version of a proper 
law, laying itself open to the charge of judicial legislation?
It remains to be seen how Canadian courts will resolve such issues.28 While 
considerable restraint may be expected, the fact remains that our society accepts 
without question - perhaps more so than the United States where less govern-
“ Sce A.F. Bayefsky and M. Eberts, Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1985), in particular the sections on the physically and mentally disabled.
^(1954), 347 U.S. 483.
“ However in Re Blainey v. Ontario Hockey Association (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 513 (GA.), leave to ap­
peal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed, reported at (1986), 58 O.R. (2d) 274 the Court 
struck down the provision of the Ontario Human Rights Code, (1981), c.53, s.19(2) that excluded sex 
discrimination in sports from the general provisions barring discrimination on the basis of sex. 
Similarly in Connett v. University o f British Columbia (1988), [1988] B.CJ. No. 13 (CA.) the Court 
struck down the provision of the provincial human rights code that facilitated mandatory retirement. 
This latter case is presently on Appeal before the Supreme Court of Canada.
ment is still to some extent equated with good government - that the state has af­
firmative obligations to its citizens. It would be surprising if this attitude were not 
reflected in the judgments of our courts.
Another area where the affirmative duty of the state to protect its members 
has been recently raised, concerns the debate about foetal rights which has oc­
cupied the Supreme Court of Canada not infrequently over past years. Cases like 
MorgentalerBorowski,30 and Daigle 31 can be seen as disputes between individu­
als. But the issue they raise is more fundamental. Does the unborn foetus have a 
right to life - a right which should be protected through the courts? Here agaîn 
the drama has already been partially played south of the border. In Roe v. 
Wade,32 the Supreme Court asserted that States had the right to protect foetal 
rights after the first three months of pregnancy - the trimester rule. Webster,33 
which was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court this July, raised the question of the 
duty of the state toward the citizen in a different guise. The issue there was 
whether the state could prohibit the use of state funds and facilities for abortions 
other than those performed to save the mother’s life, and whether it could impose 
testing for viability after 20 weeks gestational age. The case thus posed a conflict 
between two affirmative state obligations - the assumed state obligation to protect 
the unborn and the assumed state obligation to provide funds for medical care. 
The Supreme Court answered both questions posed in the affirmative. Rehnquist 
C J., writing for the Court, rejected the idea of a constitutionally guaranteed affir­
mative right to government aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure 
life, liberty or property interests of which the government may not deprive the in­
dividual.” At the same time, writing for the majority on the fetal testing provi­
sions, he affirmed an expanded, but not unlimited, government power to regulate 
abortion.35
The issue of sterilization of the mentally defective raises another example of 
a call on the state to protect individuals. In the case of Eve36 which not long ago
*Mortgentalerv. R. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
^BorowsJd v. A.G. Canada [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342.
3lDaigle v. Tremblay [1989] Q J. No. 1, reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada August 8,1989.
32Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113.
33Webster (A.G. Missouri) v. Reproductive Health Services (1989), 49 C.CH. S.Ct. Bull. B4589 (U.S.
S.C.).
MIbid. at B4604.
^Ibid. at B4617-4618, per Rehnquist CJ.: ‘There is no doubt that our holding today will allow some 
governmental regulation of abortion that would have been prohibited under the language of such 
cases as Colaum v. Franklin, . . . .  But the goal of constitutional adjudication is surely not to remove 
inexorably ‘‘politically divisive issues from the ambit of the legislative process, whereby the people 
through their elected representatives deal with matters of concern to them. The goal of constitu­
tional adjudication is to hold true the balance between that which the Constitution puts beyond the 
reach of the democratic process and that which it does not. We think we have done that today.” 
Justice Scalia, while concurring in the result, disclaimed the Courts right to meddle in what he 
regarded as a purely political question. Justice Blackmun dissented for the opposite reason.
Supra, note 16.
came before the Supreme Court, the question was whether a young woman, men­
tally defective, should be sterilized. She was sub-intelligent, and unable to care 
for any offspring she might produce. Her widowed mother who was approaching 
sixty feared that she would have to assume the responsibility for the child should 
Eve become pregnant, and wanted her sterilized. An application for an author­
ization to sterilize her was refused by the court of first instance but allowed by the 
Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal. The Official Trustee, Eve’s Guardian ad 
litem, appealed. The Supreme Court forbade the sterilization, stating the Court’s 
Parens patriae jurisdiction could only be exercised for the benefit of the person m 
need of protection and not for the benefit of others. The Court decided that 
sterilization should never be authorized for non-therapeutic purposes under the 
Parens patriae jurisdiction.
Other courts have reached different conclusions on this issue. Shortly before 
Eve the Court of Appeal of British Columbia had ruled in favour of the steriliza­
tion of such a person,37 although the Supreme Court in Eve distinguished tiie ear­
lier case as involving a therapeutic procedure. Since the Supreme Court s deci­
sion in Eve was released the House of Lords in England considered this question 
and, rejecting the restrictions set out in Eve, allowed a sterilization on the basis 
that it was in the handicapped individual’s best interest.3®
Similar issues arise with respect to the provision of medical services to chil­
dren contrary to the wishes of their parents. We are all familiar with applications 
to the court to obtain orders for blood transfusions for children, or to provide a 
brain shunt for a child who will die without it.40 These cases pose in stark relief 
the conflict between the right of parents to do what they think is best for their 
child, against the perceived duty of the court to protect the life of the child.
The legal peg upon which many of these new appeals to the court for pro­
tection of life are hung, is the ancient concept of Parens patriae - the idea that the 
state, through the instrumentality of the court, acts as parent or protector of the 
person who cannot protect himself. The doctrine originated in feudal times and 
was originally concerned primarily with care and conservation of the estate of an 
incompetent person. Parens patnae responsibility was transferred from the feudal 
lords, to the royal household during the reign of Edward I and in the 1540’s was 
shifted from the royal household to the Court of Wards and liveries. In the 17th 
Century it was transferred to the Court of Chancery, lost its connection with 
property, and became purely protective in nature. The doctrine of Parens patnae 
presents an interesting example of how an old concept can be used to support the 
modern conception of the obligations of the state to its members.
31Supra, note 16.
“ in Re B (A Minor) (1987), [1987] H .U . No. 21.
x Re Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto and F (1988), 66 O.R. (2d) 528 (Prov. Ct. Fam.
Div.).
The emphasis on the obligation of the state to its citizens has pervaded even 
the common law of tort and contract. In addition to the common law’s expansion 
of the tort law duty of care, and the development of such innovations as un- 
conscionability and fundamental breach in contract law, the legislatures have in­
tervened extensively to protect the populace from harm and help them recover 
from mishaps. In tort law, for example, the statutory onus shift41 helps 
pedestrians injured as a result of a motor vehicle accident obtain a judgment 
against a negligent motorist, while mandatory insurance requirements ensure that 
they will get paid if they win in court. Health insurance, unemployment insurance 
and other such components of our social safety net spread risk, while legislative 
restrictions on dangerous activities such as driving, flying or shooting are enacted 
to minimize exposure to risk. Contract, business, and property law has also been 
revolutionized by the legislature. Consumer protection and sale of goods statutes 
add mandatory protective terms and warranties to commercial transactions while 
business corporations acts impose minimum standards of conduct on those estab­
lishing or operating a business. The relations between landlord and tenant are 
now largely set out in statute form, and land titles registries have ousted the pos­
sibility of obtaining title by adverse possession.
V. Problems Posed by the New Role of the Judicial?
In this segment of my lecture I propose to examine some of the problems which 
are posed by the new responsibilities of the judiciary which I have outlined - 
responsibilities with respect to the framework of government, the rights of indi­
viduals to be free from state interference, and the affirmative obligations of the 
state toward its citizens. Developments in these three areas, as well as in certain 
areas of the common law, involve a realignment of the traditional relationships 
between the judiciary and other branches of government. We must ask ourselves 
anew: what are the respective roles of the legislatures, the executive and the judi­
ciary? How should these institutions respond in the face of the realignments of 
traditional power patterns between them?
Two fundamental questions must be considered by all those concerned with 
these matters. The first concerns how far the courts can and should go in enun­
ciating and enforcing new rights. In other words, how far and in what circum­
stances should the courts intrude into the spheres traditionally reserved to the 
legislative and executive branches? The other question concerns the response of 
the legislative and executive branches to the new alignment of powers. How 
should they conduct themselves so as to avoid the necessity for over-inclusive 
judicial review? When a law that it has passed is ruled invalid, how should a 
legislative body respond? When new state obligations are imposed, what are the 
implications for the executive, charged with enforcement of the law?
I turn first to the question of how far the courts should venture into territory 
traditionally reserved to the legislative and executive branches of government. 
For the most part, the courts have little control over the scope of their mandate.
41For example see Highway TYaflicAct, R .S .0.1980, c.198, s.167.
The legislatures, through the enactment of laws, constitutional and otherwise, and 
the litigants, through the bringing of suits, essentially determine what questions 
the courts must answer. Within these constraints, however, courts may choose 
between broad and narrow interpretations of legislation and precedents. But 
even here the role of the courts is limited. For example, while considerable scope 
for choice was present immediately after the coming into force of the Charter, 
judicial precedent since then has fixed the parameters of most of the rights and 
freedoms, leaving limited room for policy decisions about whether the court 
should or should not venture on particular questions.42
Within these limits, there exist good reasons why courts cannot avoid a 
certain degree of judicial activism. The first is that if the courts fail to art, the 
citizens of our society will find their rights curtailed. The courts are the ultimate 
guardians of the rights of society, in our system of government. Legislatures may 
pass laws upholding these rights; boards and human rights councils may act to en­
force them. But when conflicts arise, it is to the courts that the citizen must turn. 
If the courts decline to act, the law becomes an empty symbol, full of sound and 
fury but signifying nothing. One need only look to the elaborate guarantees of 
rights found in the constitutions of many non-democratic countries. The paper 
reads magnificently. But the reality is otherwise. The difference lies in a single 
factor - the absence of an independent judiciary which is prepared to uphold the 
citizen’s rights. Only thus can we be assured of the rule of law and spared the 
rule of tyranny.43
Another reason why the courts cannot decline to act is related to the first; it 
is their function in curbing the wrongful exercise of power. If the courts do not 
uphold the peoples’ rights, the state may unduly impinge upon them. If the courts 
do not confine Parliament and the legislatures to their respective constitutional 
spheres, the equilibrium between the national and more local exercise of power 
will be disturbed. If the courts do not respond to abuses of executive power by 
the state and its agencies, the rights of individuals will suffer. As Lord Denning 
has stated:
In all societies there is a hierarchy of power. At the top there may sometimes 
be a king or a dictator, at other times a president or a prime minister, or yet 
again a totalitarian party. Below the top there are hundreds of subordinates who 
wield power of one kind or another. Throughout history you will find instances 
of power being misused or abused. On occasion the abuse is so great that the 
only remedy is by rebellion. - as of the Barons in 1215 or Parliament in 1642. Yet 
such a remedy is much to be deplored. The rebels are judges in their own cause.
In modem times as often as not they are terrorists - seeking to change the Con-
42For example Reference re Section 94(2) of the British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 
486 decided that fundamental justice was to be given a substantive, not merely procedural meaning 
and that laws whose substantive content violated the Charter should be struck down.
^ t  is interesting to note that an important aspect of the current reforms in the Soviet Union is the 
effort to reinstate an independent legal system in place of administrative or bureaucratic fiat, i.e. the 
rule of law instead of the rule of power.
stitution by violence. The only admissible remedy for any abuse of power - in a 
civilized society - is by recourse to law.
In order to ensure this recourse, it is important that the law itself should pro­
vide adequate and efficient remedies for the abuse or misuse of power from 
whatever quarter it may come. No matter who it is - who is guilty of the abuse or 
misuse. Be it government, national or local. Be it trade unions. Be it the press. 
Be it management. Be it labour. Whoever it be, no matter how powerful, the 
law should provide a remedy for the abuse or misuse of power, else the op­
pressed will get to the point when they will stand it no longer. They will find 
their own remedy. There will be anarchy.44
The third reason why courts may be forced to act in a more interventionist 
way I have already touched on. It is the failure from time to time of other bran­
ches of government to respond to the need for legislation in certain difficult 
areas. The quantity of legislation passed by Parliament and our legislatures on 
the surface may appear staggering. But on difficult social and political issues, the 
legislative response may be delayed, or the legislation may be so drafted as to 
place upon the judiciary the responsibility for resolution of problems too thorny 
for the legislators to tackle. The same phenomenon has been remarked in the 
United States, where the system of checks and balances between the executive 
and legislative branches and the disparity of views on certain issues may lead to 
legislative deadlock. The result, scholars postulate, is that the judiciary responds 
to fill the vacuum - “the safety valve theory of judicial review.”4* The mechanism, 
I suspect, is less one of deliberate decision on the part of courts to move into the 
vacant terrain, as of response to increasing demands for judicial action in the face 
of a clear need and no other apparent solution but judicial action.
Our courts, while responding to pressures such as these, nevertheless are 
concerned not to trench too much on the legislative role. Judges, by training and 
temperament, are most comfortable with the traditional judicial role of applying 
established precedents and the laws made by others to familiar situations. More­
over, judges are acutely aware of the dangers and difficulties inherent in the new 
role that, whether they like it or not, is being thrust upon them.
The first problem is that of defining the appropriate judicial response. Sec­
tion 52 of the Charter, for example, renders invalid all laws inconsistent with the 
preceptS' it lays down. The problem is that frequently the legislative provision im­
pugned is a small portion of a larger law. To remove that provision may be to 
distort a carefully crafted legislative scheme and impose a result which the legis­
lators would not have contemplated. Removal of an offending exception to a 
right granted, for example, may broaden the impact of legislation. This is what 
happened in the United States when the court ruled that blacks could not be ex­
44 Lord Denning, “Misuse of Power” (1981), 55 Australian Law Journal 720 at 720.
^C R- Ducat, Modes o f Constitutional Interpretation (St. Paul, Minn: West Publishing, 1978) at 278.
eluded from educational benefits or that every citizen had equal rights to vote. In 
Canada, courts have struck out exceptions to rights guaranteed by Human Rights 
Codes, thereby extending the right to be free of discrimination on the basis of age 
beyond the limit of 65 that was established by the legislature,46 and extending the 
ban against sex discrimination by the removal of an exception for sports ac­
tivities.47 In other contexts, however, the removal of a provision on constitutional 
grounds may have much broader consequences, such as the creation of a new of­
fence.48 f>naHian courts confront problems such as these every day since the ad­
vent of the Charter. The dilemma is obvious. To fail to act is to fail to uphold a 
right granted by the constitution; to act may be to impose a result at variance with 
the legislative scheme in question.
These problems, of a technical legal nature, stand apart from the inherent 
difficulties involved in defining the ambit of the rights and freedoms guaranteed 
by the Charter, or formulating the correct response to difficult social and moral is­
sues like abortion and the sterilization of mentally deficient persons. The answers 
to such questions often involve the resolution of competing convictions and may 
have wide implications. Judges, unlike legislators, have no forum for open debate 
equivalent to the House of Commons or the Legislative Chamber. The views 
aired before the Courts are limited to those of the litigants, the judicial perspec­
tive limited to what the parties say and the instincts and background which the 
judge brings to the case. Compromises available to legislators may not be open 
to courts, which are confined to all or nothing, valid or invalid, rulings. More­
over, the doctrine of stare decisis reduces the ability of courts to alter or adjust 
solutions which prove inadequate or erroneous. The highest courts m Britain, 
Australia, the United States and Canada now assert the power to reverse earlier 
decisions which prove inappropriate,49 as witness the recent reversal by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in the pregnancy cases.50 One is led to query, neverthe­
46 As was decided in a number of British Columbia decisions including that in Connell v. University of 
British Columbia (1988), [1988] B.CJ. No. 13 (GA.) which is presently under appeal at the Supreme 
Court of Canada.
47 In Re Blainey v. Ontario Hockey Association (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 513 (GA.), leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada dismissed, reported at (1986), 58 O.R. (2d) 274 the Court struck down the 
provision of the Ontario Human Rights Code, (1981), c.53, s.19(2) that excluded sex discrimination in
sports.
^Although this question would not appear to have been addressed in a Canadian decision, the 
courts in the U.S. have ruled that an unconstitutional section of a statute could not be struck out if it 
would result in the judicial creation of a crime without legislative sanction 
violative provision in its entirety must be struck down. Tatro v. Mississippi (1979), 372 So.2d 283 
(Miss. Supreme Court). In addition the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled the retroactive a p ^ ‘<>n f  
a common law rule to be violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment Marks v. U.S. 
(1977), 430 U.S. 188 thus suggesting that Canadian courts would consider the creation of a new 
criminal offence in this manner to constitute a violation of the principles of fondamental ^
also “Note: The effect of an Unconstitutional Exception Clause Upon the Remainder of a Statute 
(1942), 55 Harvard Law Review 1030 at 1031 which notes that ‘The Courts have usually refused to 
extend the scope of a criminal statute by this procedure - since to do so would create new crimes, 
(footnotes deleted).
^See P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 183-185.
«See Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.GR. 1219 and Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., [1989] 
1 S.C.R. 1252 which took a different view of sexual discrimination than had been taken in m ss v.
less, whether the judicial forum is the best one for resolving the difficult social 
and political issues of our time?
Yet another dysfunctional aspect of excessive reliance on judicial review is 
the inherent conservatism of the judicial process. The process at best is slow, 
piecemeal, and frequently deals with only a small part of a larger, more complex 
problem.51 It has been pointed out that “insofar as chronic reliance is placed 
upon the courts for the rectification of social ills, institutions of popular control 
atrophy and fall prey to those forces with ever-narrower designs on the uses of 
power. 52 Finally, it has been said that “judicial pronouncements convey the illu­
sion that the problem has been taken care of, when, in fact, nothing may really 
have been done at all, because the Court’s judgment has been quietly dis­
regarded.”3
This raises one of the most problematic aspects of too great a reliance on the 
courts in remedying social ills. A judiciary charged with a more active role must 
also confront the problem of enforcement. The judiciary has no independent 
means by which to enforce its edicts. What happens if the legislative and execu­
tive branches fail to act to further or uphold the rights and obligations enunciated 
by a court? One view is that the courts should decline to act unless it is clear 
their edicts will be enforced. Justice Frankfurter of the United States Supreme 
Court recognized this in a comment from the bench in Brown v. Board of Educa­
tion. Said he:
Nothing could be worse from my point of view than for this Court to make an
abstract declaration that segregation is bad and then have it evaded by tricks.54
In the end, as we all know, the Court did declare segregation to be wrong. 
And, predictably, disillusionment followed when the inevitable evasions occurred 
and segregation continued. Some judges responded by giving detailed, literal or­
ders, virtually taking over the administration of schools or dictating the develop­
ment of desegregated housing. The image of a judge making day to day opera­
tional decisions in the running of a school - down to what kind of tennis balls to 
order in one case - is hardly one most Canadian judges would embrace.55 And 
the verdict on the results of judicial administration, is, to put it at its highest, 
mixed. Not only do practical problems arise out of the courts inability to adminis-
Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183.
51Supra, note 45.
52Ibid. at 278.
53Ibid. at 278.
54Supra, note 27.
55There being a long tradition in the Anglo-Canadian law of the Courts refusing to make an order or 
enforce a contract “the execution whereof would require continued superintendence by the court” as 
was noted in I.CF. Spry, The Principles o f Equitable Remedies: Injunctions, Specific Performance and 
Equitable Damages (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1981) at 95.
ter that which it has prescribed,56 and constitutional, separation of powersjjrob- 
lems are posed by judicial interference with state appropriation of funds. For 
example, the landmark mental health care decision in Wyattv. Stickney* led to a 
quadrupling of Alabama’s spending on mental institutions in the year following 
the decision.® Also at risk is the impartiality and neutrality of the judiciary. Judi­
cial management almost inevitably leads to conflict with the bureaucracy, whose 
decisions have been overruled by the Court, thus placing judges in an adversarial 
relationship with one of the parties before the court." And ultimately, after all 
the problems, all the delays, and all the evasions, the court’s pronouncement in 
Brown v. Board of Education in the end won the day and more and more legis­
lators and administrators accepted the need to bring their institutions into confor­
mity with the precepts laid down by the Court.
This is not to criticize the activist stance adopted by American courts in en­
forcing racial equality. They had little choice, given the uncooperative stances 
taken by many law-making and administrative institutions charged with enforcing 
the newly declared rights, an attitude which may be contrasted with that histori­
cally found in Canada, where by tradition, decrees tend to be obeyed. The 
alternative of allowing court edicts to be ignored and circumvented would not 
only have denigrated citizens’ rights, it would have made a mockery of justice and 
undermined the foundation of law and order upon which democracy ultimately 
rests.
We face similar questions in Canada under the Charter. While thus far, the 
courts have not been required to make mandatory orders against other govern­
ment bodies, the problem is a live one. The Charter’s guarantee of democratic 
rights - the right to vote in particular - illustrates some of the problems which may 
arise in enforcing judicial pronouncements on rights and suggests an alternative - 
cooperation between the judicial and legislative branches. As a trial judge in 
British Columbia, I presided over a trial in which the electoral districting of the 
province was challenged: Dixon v. A.G. for British Columbia.61 The plaintiffs 
case was predicated on the assertion that the existing electoral districts resulted m
*1*esc being concerns that have traditionally led Canadian judges to avoid involvement in such 
questions. See M. Valpy, “New Jersey’s Folly Can Teach Us a Lesson” (The Globe and Mad, Mon­
day September 25,1989, at A8) for a discussion of the damage caused by judicial interference with 
residential zoning in New Jersey.
57M  was noted in Webster, supra, the courts are generally reticent to interfere with allocative deci­
sion of the state. Many decisions have held that where the legislature faite to makean appropria­
tion, a court is powerless to remedy any resulting inequities. See Myers v. E n ^Q B 5 g ), 9 Cal. 341 
and “California Constitutional Law Doctrine of Separation of Powers (1982), 9 Pepperdine Law 
Review 715.
^(1971), 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.).
*See D.L. Horowitz, “Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions” 
(1983), [1983] Duke Law Journal 1265 at 1267.
60Ibid. at 1303, this ftmnge also suggest that judicial decisions must be evaluated for “effectiveness
as well as “rightness.”
great disparities of voting power, a vote in certain rural ridings being worth al­
most forty times a vote in larger urban ridings. I concluded that the right to vote 
guaranteed by the Charter comprehended, if not exact voter parity, relative equali­
ty of voting power having due regard for the difficulties of representation in 
remote and sparsely populated areas. Applying s. 52 of the Charier, the electoral 
law, I concluded, was void. But the consequences of striking out the statute and 
leaving the province without any electoral machinery in place in the event an elec­
tion were required to be called was, I felt, unacceptable. So I adopted the ap­
proach of the Supreme Court on the Manitoba statutory reference62 and said that 
the statute, although unconstitutional, would stay in effect for a specified period 
of time during which the legislature could move to replace it with an electoral law 
that met the requirements of the Charter. It was not for me, I felt, to dictate to 
the legislature what sort of law they should enact; that was the responsibility of 
the elected representatives. But, again following a time-honoured judicial tradi­
tion, I offered advice on what limits on the principle of one person, one vote 
might be acceptable. ’
I decided to defer the really difficult question. What would happen if the 
government, which had an obvious interest in m aintaining the electoral bound­
aries as they were, ignored the judgment and did nothing during the time allotted 
by the court for reform? Could the court issue a mandatory injunction to the 
legislature to pass the required law? Could the Court substitute a law of its own 
devising, openly entering into the legislative arena? I did not resolve these ques­
tions in my judgment. Instead, I followed the approach which Chief Justice 
Nemetz had adopted in an earlier case. In that electoral case, the Chief Justice 
had written:
If any law is inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter, it is the court's duty, 
to the extent of such inconsistency, to declare it to be of no force or effect 
(*•52(1)).
Before the Charter, the courts could and did declare legislation invalid on the 
division of powers grounds. When they did so, we know of no recent occasion 
when the legislative branch of government did not faithfully attempt to correct 
the impugned legislation. Likewise, when this Court declares a statute or portion 
thereof to be “of no force or effect” where it is inconsistent with the Charter, it is 
for the Legislature to decide what remedial steps should be take in view of that 
declaration. Section 24(1) of the Charter empowers the courts to grant citizens 
remedies where their guaranteed rights are infringed or denied... . It would be 
anomalous, indeed, if such powers were reserved only for cases where limitations 
are expressly enacted and not for cases where an unconstitutional limitation 
results because of an omission in a statute.63
aOrder: Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 347.
V*A GBC- (1986>* 70 B C-L-R- 1. [19861 2 W.W.R. 700, 24 D.L.R (4th) 718 (CA.). at
Chief Justice Nemetz proved right. The Court’s call to the government to 
correct the defective legislation was heeded in Dixon, the case with which I was 
concerned. The government moved to introduce legislation in conformity with 
the Charter and the legislation was promptly passed. The case illustrates how the 
court and the legislature, each acting within the bounds of its proper constitu­
tional responsibilities and each accepting its different constitutional responsibility, 
can efficaciously resolve a difficult issue. This is to be contrasted with the con­
frontational relationship between the courts and other branches of government 
which has from time to time arisen in the United States, and which has forced the 
courts to assume functions more properly discharged by the legislature and exec­
utive. It is too soon to postulate that Canadian legislatures as a matter of con­
stitutional convention will always respond to judicial decisions striking down legis­
lation by moving promptly to correct the deficiency. But the record to date 
augurs well.
VI. Conclusion: Toward A New Relationship
I return to the questions I posed earlier. What must the courts do to meet the 
new challenges before them? What must the legislatures do? My observations 
suggest the following answers. First, legislators and courts alike must recognize 
that it is the function of the courts to pronounce on legal issues, not to resolve the 
major questions of our time. The nature of our constitution in the post- 
Charter era means that judges will increasingly be called upon to determine legal 
questions with broad implications for our social and political system. But judicial 
review can never be a satisfactory substitute for proper legislative action. As one 
legal scholar has put it, “The Court’s decree is a promise only, delivery on that 
promise has to be rested [sic] by popular political participation.”*4
Our legislative bodies should avoid, wherever possible, the temptation to 
refrain from tackling difficult issues in the hope the courts will resolve them. 
Similarly, they should avoid the easy solution of casting difficult problems in 
vague language, thereby shifting to the courts the responsibility of defining the 
content of the legislation. Finally, they should move promptly to faithfully correct 
legislation which the court has impugned. Just as the courts must accept the re­
sponsibility which the constitution has placed upon them, so too must our legis­
lators accept their obligations.
The Charter and the increasing tendency to bring problems to the courts have 
altered the traditional balances between the legislative branch of government, the 
executive branch of government and the courts. We are, all of us, feeling our 
tentative way to a new alignment. My belief is that we can succeed through an ac­
ceptance of our mutual but quite different responsibilities and cooperation. 
There is nothing new in this. As Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme 
Court wrote in 1952:
While the Constitution diffuses power the better to preserve liberty, it also con­
templates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable 
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but independence, 
autonomy but reciprocity.65
Youngstown Sheet A Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), 343 U.S. 579 at 635 quoted in C.R. Ducat, Modes of 
Constitutional Interpretation (St. Paul, Minn: West Publishing, 1978) at 683.
